Cairo Studies on Migration and Refugees

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

Paper No.12 / September 2019

Egyptian Labour Migration in Jordan

Dina Abdelfattah

The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies

THE CENTER FOR MIGRATION AND REFUGEE STUDIES (CMRS)

The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) is an interdisciplinary center of the American University in Cairo (AUC). Situated at the heart of the Middle East and North Africa, it aims at furthering the scientific knowledge of the large, long-standing recent refugee and migration movements witnessed in this region. But it also is concerned with questions of refugees and migration in the international system as a whole, both at the theoretical and practical levels. CMRS functions include instruction, research, training, and outreach. It offers a Master of Arts degree and a graduate diploma in Migration and Refugee studies, working with other AUC departments to offer diversified courses to its students. Its research bears on issues of interest to the region and beyond. In carrying its research out, CMRS collaborates with reputable regional and international academic institutions. The training activities that CMRS organizes are attended by researchers, policymakers, bureaucrats and civil society activists from a great number of countries. The center also provides tailor-made training programs on demand. CMRS outreach involves working with individuals and organizations in its environment, disseminating knowledge and sensitization to refugee and migration issues. It also provides services to the refugee community in Cairo and transfers its expertise in this respect to other international institutions.

About the author:

Dina Abdelfattah is an Assistant Professor of Economics at AUC.

PREFACE

As the largest migrant sending country in the region, labour migration plays an important role in Egypt' economy. It relieves heavy pressures on its domestic labour market and is a crucial source of foreign exchange for its economy.

Egyptian labour migration encompasses two systems, one to the Arab Middle East and one to Europe and North America. Mass Egyptian labour migration to countries in the Arab Middle East started in the mid-1970s when emigration was encouraged by the new constitution. One essential consideration for encouraging migration was the need to find external outlets for the growing Egyptian labour force and to thus defuse the employment question. The domestic labour market was not deemed capable of absorbing the Egyptian supply of labour.

Demand for labour exploding in the mid-1970s in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), after the historical oil price increases of 1973-74, met the supply of Egyptian labour. It caused large flows of Egyptian workers to the Gulf. Egyptian workers also headed to Jordan, Libya, Lebanon and, until 1991, to Iraq.

Many Egyptians have chosen Jordan as their country of destination due to its easy entry requirements and its relatively low costs of work permits. Bilateral agreements between Egypt and Jordan have been signed to encourage the migration of Egyptian, first agreement dates back to 1985 and followed by a Memorandum of Understanding in 2007.

Over forty years on, the situation of the Egyptian labour market has not improved. It remains the principal factor determining labour migration. The aim of this report is to provide an up to date analysis of the situation of the Egyptian labour market and explores the current situation of Egyptian labour migration to Jordan. The report is based on analyzing three household surveys: the Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey 2012 (ELMPS12), the Survey of Young People in Egypt 2009 and 2014 (SYPE09 and SYPE14) and the Jordanian Labour Market Panel Survey 2016 (JLMPS16).

The report is part of a larger research project by the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) and funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC). The larger report explores the impact of the influx of Syrian refugees, triggered by the political unrest in Syria, to Jordan on the supply and demand of Egyptian labour migrants in Jordan and suggests policies to improve the governance of Egyptian labour migration to Jordan.

Ibrahim Awad
Director

ABSTRACT

Introduction

Over the past forty years, the situation of the Egyptian labour market has not improved and remains to be the principal factor determining labour migration. In the past decade, creation of job opportunities has lagged behind labour force growth, which has led many to resort to migrating. According to the Egyptian Population Census (2017), the total Egyptian migration amounted to 9.5 million, compared to 4.4 million in 2015 with Saudi Arabia and Jordan being the main countries of destination. This report tackles the current situation of Egyptian labour migration in one of its major Arab destinations, Jordan. The figure announced for Jordan was 1.2 million.

On another front, the Syrian crisis in 2011 has generated millions of refugees. Jordan is among the major countries hosting Syrian refugees. Among these refugees are hundreds of thousands of workers who have necessarily affected the Jordanian labour market and may have affected the demand for Egyptian migrant workers. In addition to the demand, the terms and conditions of Egyptian workers employment may have been affected by the excess labour supply, the low wages and long working hours accepted by refugee workers out of necessity.

Objectives

The report has the following three objectives:

1. Unpack the profiles of Egyptian migrant workers in Jordan
2. Understand the changes of the demand and supply of Egyptian migrant workers and their working conditions in Jordan.
3. Propose policies that can improve the governance of Egyptian labour migration to Jordan.

Methodology

This report was prepared on the basis of a secondary analysis of the Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS), the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) and the Jordanian Labour Market Panel Survey (JLMPS).

Findings

Migration to Jordan is considered a stage in the lifetime of Egyptian migrants. The most prevalent paths for Egyptian returnees from Jordan are either to stay for a couple of years to accumulate savings that would allow them to migrate to other regions, or to go back to Egypt and start their own businesses. Looking at their profiles, Egyptian migrants to Jordan are mainly young individual

males, with less representation of females or married males. Lower education levels and lower skill levels dominate the pool of Egyptian migrants to Jordan. Egyptian migrants, when compared to other nationalities, work for longer hours and mainly represented in sectors with harsh working conditions. Egyptians rely considerably on their networks to facilitate their migration to Jordan. It mainly helps them in finding a job and accommodation. Finally, Egyptian migration to Jordan is considered one of the most important migration flows for Egyptians. The proximity of Jordan and the easy Arabic dialect facilitate this flow. Furthermore, the demand for Egyptians in certain sectors, as opposed to other nationalities, has ensured this continuation of flows. In recent years, the number of Syrians in Jordan has increased significantly. However, the impact of such influx on Egyptian migrant workers is yet to be determined. Therefore, quantitative and qualitative are recommended to form a better understanding of the status quo and a better prediction of the future of Egyptians in Jordan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

As the largest migrant sending country in the region, Egypt considerably depends on labour migration to boost its economy. It relieves domestic labour market and is a crucial source of foreign exchange. However, the recent changes in the regional political environment resulting in large refugee movements has driven unexpected growth in labour supply, which may have spurred competition with the Egyptian migrant labour. These changes may have also been manifest in deteriorated or improved relations between Egypt and the countries of destination. In this new regional political environment, it is legitimate to raise questions about the impact of these changes on Egyptian labour and ultimately on Egypt's economic and political stability.

Over the past forty years, the Egyptian labour market has taken no remarkable strides forward. Yet, it remains the main determinant of labour migration. In the past decade, creation of job opportunities has lagged behind labour force growth. The reasons can largely be attributed to high unemployment rates, especially among the youth and the educated, and to the workers tendency to join the informal sector to secure income, which is normally largely insufficient to meet their needs and their families'.

The latest estimates of the labour force sample survey published in November 2017 shows the unemployment trends. In the third quarter of 2017, the overall unemployment rate stood at 11.9 per cent, going down to 10% by the third quarter of 2018. These unemployment rates are, however, markedly higher for the youth, recording 32.6% unemployment rate among Egyptian youth in 2018. Disaggregated unemployment rates by gender and age groups prove that the situation of females is much worse than that of males of all age groups and throughout the years.

Figures 1 and 2 below show the evolution of total unemployment rate over time in the early 2000, disaggregated by gender. Figure 1 shows an upward trend of unemployment rates, as a total and per gender, between 2012 and 2015. This highlights the labour market imbalances during that period which has witnessed political and economic instability in the aftermath of the uprisings. It can also be noticed that unemployment rates among females, through the years and for all age

groups is significantly higher than that of males. Whereas, unemployment rates among the males aged 20-24 is the highest among all age groups in the period 2015-2017.

Looking deeply into the educational background of the unemployed in Egypt, unemployment rates of both genders are highest among the intermediate and the university levels of education. Approximately 44.4% and 39.7% of intermediate (secondary) education level and university levels, respectively, have been unemployed in 2010. Numbers have slightly improved for university graduates in 2015, showing an unemployment rate of 31.8%, and 45.1% for the intermediate levels. The Labour Force Sample Survey confirms similar results for the year 2017. Unemployment rates among intermediate and university graduates have reached 52.2% and 40.6% respectively.[1] These findings only show that unemployment in Egypt is most prevalent among the young and educated.

Figure 1: Unemployment rates by age group, 1998-2017



Source: Author's own calculations using ELMPS1998, ELMPS 2006, LFS2010, ELMPS2012 and LFS 2017

[1] CAPMAS, Labour Force Survey 2017

Figure 2: Unemployment rates by age group and gender, 2006-2017



Source: Author's own calculations using ELMPS 1998, ELMPS 2006, LFS2010, ELMPS 2012 and LFS 2017

According to the Egyptian Population Census (2017), the total Egyptian migration amounted to 9.5 million, compared to 4.4 million in 2015. The figures announced for Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE were 1.2 million, 500,000, 230,000 and 765,000 respectively[2]. Exaggerated or not, the numbers of Egyptian migrants in the Gulf and the Arab countries is significant, and Saudi Arabia and Jordan appear to be the most attractive destinations.

Little is known about the current structure of Egyptian labour migration in Arab countries in general, and in each country in particular. This structure has changed over the last 40 years, due to the development of native human resources in GCC countries, the diversification of the economies of these countries and competition posed by workers of other origins. Information on present living and working terms and conditions of Egyptian migrant workers is not available either.

[2] In an October 2017 special issue of the Bulletin of the Egyptian Society of Migration Studies (in Arabic), Ayman Zohry, a noted Egyptian demographer, considers the CAPMAS-announced volumes exaggerated.

This report tackles the current situation of Egyptian labour migration in one of its major Arab destinations, Jordan. The civil strife in Syria since 2011 has generated millions of refugees. Jordan is among the major countries, after Lebanon and Turkey, hosting Syrian refugees. Estimates of refugees in Jordan have varied between 630,000 registered with UNHCR and 1.3 million estimated by host authorities. Among these refugees are hundreds of thousands of workers. This fresh supply of labour has necessarily affected the Jordanian labour market and may have affected, by the same token, the demand for Egyptian migrant workers. In addition to the demand, the terms and conditions of Egyptian workers employment may have been affected by the excess labour supply, the low wages and long working hours accepted by refugee workers out of necessity.

This report intends to achieve two main objectives:
1: To understand the changes of the demand and supply of Egyptian migrant workers and their working conditions.
2: To propose policies that can improve the governance of Egyptian labour migration to Jordan.

Upon achieving those two objectives, the report attempts to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Egyptian migrant workers in Jordan?
2. What was the professional profile in Egypt in terms of employment status, sectors, occupations, successive jobs if relevant, and job compatibility with level and type of education?
3. What is the current professional profile in Jordan? For example, employment status, sectors, occupations, successive jobs if relevant, city and/or region of employment, planned duration of stay, job compatibility with the level and type of education.
4. What are the terms and conditions of employment of Egyptian workers in Jordan?
5. What are the living conditions? For example, private individual apartment or shared apartment or camps?
6. What is the amount of rent in absolute terms and compared to income?

7. What are the causes of seeking external employment in general, and in Jordan in particular? and how was the job identified before travelling to Jordan?
8. What were the formal and informal recruitment processes?
9. What were the means of travel and how was it funded?
10. What is the impact of the regional changes on the demand on Egyptian labour and terms and conditions of employment?
11. What is the status of Egyptian migrant workers, having returned to Egypt as a result of these changes?
12. What is the annual volume of remittances from Jordan to Egypt? What are the means of remitting? How many times money is remitted per year? To whom remittances are sent? What is the use of remittances?
13. What is the cost of remitting money to Egypt? What obstacles do workers face in remitting money? And how different is formal from informal employment in terms of remittances?

2. EGYPTIAN CONTEXT

1. Demographics of Egypt

Throughout the last decade, Egypt has gone through a unique phase of demographic evolution characterised by a youth bulge, driven by the hidden momentum of population growth, where birth rates have increased and then decreased, exerting a delayed impact on the overall population growth rate. This bulge has emerged with a baby boom that worked through the education system, impacting the labour market. Its admission into the labour market (job hiring age) has been recorded in the year 2009, thus impacting the labour market throughout the decade.

Additionally, the young people step into parenthood and get integrated in marriage markets, creating a new baby boom only to act as an echo to the youth bulge. This echo reverberates for a number of reasons; amongst which is the already large number of females of childbearing age. The 2017 population census of Egypt confirmed that the echo and the bulge is currently taking place at the 5-9 age group. Therefore, the youth bulge is inevitably followed by another bulge (the echo of the previous one) and is reflected in another baby boom that has occurred in the period 2011/2012. Figure 3 below confirms the current bulge taking place at the 5-9 age group. This

represents a new upcoming challenge for Egypt with regards to the education system, as in a decade's time, another youth bulge at working age is expected to create new pressures on the labour market.

Economists have referred to the economic role of women and their reduced opportunities in the labour market towards the increased fertility rates (Krafft 2016). Historically, the public sector has been the main employer of women in Egypt. The flexible working conditions and the shorter working hours, as well as the stability and protection (social insurance and pension schemes) are the main reasons behind the popularity of the public sector among women. The private sector, on the other hand, is not in harmony with the social role of women. Lack of flexibility, long working hours and limited access to benefits are the main reasons behind this lack of harmony. Moreover, women find the private informal sector a non-prestigious place of work. In addition, the terms and conditions of employment in the informal sector highly render it as an insecure sector, with the lack of access to medical and social insurance as well as pension schemes. This situation has limited the presence of women in the labour market and condensed their representation out of it. This has contributed to the relatively lower opportunity cost of having children. Given the absence of job sacrifice, the opportunity cost of having children has decreased, leading to the increased total fertility rates (TFR) and accordingly causing the echo of the youth bulge.

Figure 3: Total population distribution by age group, 2017



Source: Author's own calculations using CAPMAS population census, 2017.

Understanding the impact of this demographic structure on the labour market in Egypt calls for the revision of education and employment policies and programs applied in the 1960s. During president Abdel Nasser's regime, in the late 1950s (1956-59), a series of nationalisation programmes, commonly known as "Egyptianization" has started which eventually led to the nationalization of the Egyptian private sector, and the expansion of the public sector by the early 1960s. The government had embarked on an employment drive, where every state-owned enterprise was required to include, among its annual targets, the creation of new job opportunities. This promise to hire has encouraged the employment of young people, taking advantage of the government's free education policy.

The Egyptian government was able to keep its promise so long as the number of graduates was limited and government revenues from oil, gas and foreign aid were maintained. Starting the mid-1980s, with the fall in oil prices, the financial pressures started to accumulate, together with the rise in the number of educated young people, the government's commitment has been altered, which was manifest in the delayed hiring of new graduates. This has led to a dramatic contraction of public sector hiring (down from 70% of all educated new entrants to the labour market in 1980, to 20% in 2006).[3]

The economic and political instability that has erupted in 2011 and continued for the years after has created new pressures on and challenges for the private sector, driving a number of existing local private sector companies out of the market. On the other hand, these challenges and pressures have scared off new local investments and have even led to the shrinkage of existing companies. Foreign investments have recorded their lowest levels during this period of time. This contraction in the formal private sector has led to a slowdown of employment in the sector. Paralleled with the limited capacity of the public sector, this situation meant that the informal private sector represents

[3] In absolute terms, the total number of public sector employees has increased from 4.2 million in 1980 to 6.3 million in 2006. However, with the accelerated increase in the labour force (from 13 million to 23 million) and the inability of the private sector to absorb the remaining job seekers, unemployment rates have increased significantly.

the main labour market absorbent for the majority of the new educated entrants to the labour market.

New entrants to the labour market, with higher levels of education have waited for the right job opportunity that matches their levels. They started queuing up for the formal private sector jobs, causing the swelling of unemployment rates, especially among educated young ones. On the other hand, the youths with lower levels of education have joined the informal sector, unable to financially afford the wait for a formal job. This situation has led to the prevalence of unemployment among university graduates.

2. Unemployment and out of labour force population

Unemployment rates among the Egyptian youth is significantly higher than other age groups. Youths represent approximately 80% of the total unemployed population in Egypt (with the highest rates among the 20-24 age group) (ETF, 2015). This highlights the fact that unemployment in Egypt is a problem specific to the young people, where unemployment figures become more significant among the ones with higher levels of education.

The youth bulge represents both an opportunity and a burden on national economies.[4] Being an opportunity and/or a burden is determined by the policies aiming at the inclusion of the young people into the national economic, social and political spheres. The policies in Egypt have failed to socially, politically and economically integrate young people. Therefore, the pressures on the economy and the inability of the labour market to absorb the growing labour force, in addition to the lack of job supply in the public sector and the economic slowdown, have all contributed significantly to youth unemployment.

Given this economic downturn and slowdown in labour market activity, Assaad and Krafft (2015) reported that the educated young people from higher social backgrounds who could afford to stay

[4] The youth bulge acts as an opportunity by providing a pool of individuals who contribute to the human capital of the country. A burden is felt when the infrastructure (including education and health) does not efficiently improve the quality of the human capital.

longer without a job because they were supported by their parents constituted the majority of the pool of unemployed young people. Others, both males and females, who cannot support themselves and their families without having a job resort to the informal sector.[5] According to El-Laithy et al. (2003), "….(t)he Egyptian poor tend to live in large families, have low levels of education, work in the informal sector and be concentrated in low-paying unskilled activities"(p. 14). These conditions have worsened in the years 2008-2010 due to the global financial crisis further dampening job creation in the Egyptian economy.

The plight of the youth unemployment in Egypt has its roots in the high rates among the more financially able and educated as compared to the poor and the less educated. The less educated and less financially able young people cannot afford to stay without a job, due to the financial constraints they face, and they would accept any kind of job they get. However, the educated and the better off young people can afford to stay longer without a job, waiting for a formal and a more stable job offer. The unemployment problem is more acute among the educated young people of Egypt. This situation is complemented by a relatively lower demand of the skilled and educated labour, with higher hiring rates of the low skilled, low productivity with inadequate wages. Accordingly, high youth unemployment (according to CAPMAS 2005 Labour Force Sample Survey 92% of the unemployed are below the age of 30), high levels of informality, and poor quality jobs are the main negative outcomes of the Egyptian labour market.

The current situation of the labour market outcome for Egyptian youths and the spread of unemployment, in addition to the economic, social and political instability has led to the spread of poverty. Labour market productivity has also declined significantly, which is considered a main barrier to sustainable economic development, especially as regards the mismatch between education output and labour market needs.[6] This mismatch is highly represented in the increasing demand on university education, and the deterioration in the social image of vocational education, which has eroded the much needed skills in the labour market.

---

[5] One of the most famous informal jobs for females, especially the ones with no education or with low levels of education is domestic house helpers, more commonly known as housemaids. This category is not however represented in surveys, due to the discouragement of the girls reporting it. To them, it is regarded as a non-prestigious and humiliating job.

[6] The productivity of workers is related to the output per worker, with the mismatch between education output and labour market requirements, the production per worker has declined, reducing the human capital efficiency.

3. Entrepreneurship

Labour market instability over the past decades has led to the deterioration of unemployment rates, especially among the youths, particularly the educated of them. Out of these facts, in addition to the deteriorated quality of jobs and the increased informalities, the government of Egypt has taken action to encourage entrepreneurship, especially among the youths.

The Egyptian government has taken positive steps towards encouraging entrepreneurship since 1991 with the inauguration of the social fund for development (SFD). The main objective of the fund is job creation through encouraging micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Accordingly, NGOs and micro funding institutions have started to provide financial support in different forms. Recently, these institutions have moved towards providing financial assistance, in addition to training and skill enhancement on a rather limited scale. Start-ups incubators are considered the most recent efforts towards encouraging entrepreneurship mainly benefiting the young people with high levels of education and skills, adopting new and innovative ideas. Incubators work on matching them with potential investors.

Despite of the existing efforts, incubators are not spread enough or accessible to all youths, especially the new entrants to the labour market. Regarding the engagement in entrepreneurial activities, the percentage of youth entrepreneurs has increased from 1.6% in 2009 to 5.4% in 2014 according to SYPE09 and SYPE14. Meanwhile, the percentage of youth employed in the informal sector has declined from 65.3% in 2009 to 56.9 in 2014.

Youth entrepreneurs are male dominated, where only 11% are females. They are among the elder age group, with an average of 27 years and are married, where 60% and 80% of male and female entrepreneurs are married, respectively. While 15% of male and 30% of female youth entrepreneurs are with a university degree, 49% and 42% of male and female entrepreneurs, respectively, have a secondary technical degree. Youth male and female entrepreneurs are distributed among the wealth quintiles, with a larger concentration of females around the first and second quintiles, while males are concentrated in the third and fourth quintiles. This situation has manifested itself in both periods (2009 and 2014).

Challenges still exist, hindering the youth from pursuing entrepreneurial activities. The main challenge and barrier to entry is access to credit. Fear from failure, bearing financial costs and indebtedness are the main barriers to entrepreneurial activities among the youth. Accordingly, the youth benefiting from entrepreneurial activities are not amongst the target group of unemployed, out of labour force or the informal workers.

4. Laws and regulations

Employment relationships in Egypt are governed by four main laws, namely, Law No.47 for the year 1978, which applies to civil servants of the State; Law No.48 for the year 1978, which organizes the rules applicable to public sector employees; Law No.203 for the year 1991, which was promulgated to address special requirements for employees working in the public commercial sector of the State; and Law No.12 for the year 2003, which is considered the main labour law currently in Egypt, and which aims to regulate the employer-employee relationship in the private sector, and guides the contract drafting process, various types of vacations (annual leave, sick leave and maternity leave), as well as anti-discriminatory policies. Labour market regulations have identified the requirements of formality among private companies, most prominently of which is the access to social security. According to ELMPS 2012, access to social insurance in Egypt is still limited, with a coverage rate of approximately 45%. This limited coverage and the problems associated with the social security coverage and sustainability has spread informality of enterprises across Egypt.

5. Egyptian migrants

Labour market instability and the spread of informality is one of the main triggers of international migration from Egypt. Emigration from Egypt is temporary, male dominated and more common among the young population (IOM, 2011). Remittances are considered the main motive behind emigration. Young males migrate for a short period of time (average of 4-5 years) to Arab countries (GCC being the most common destination) stimulated by financial savings and remittances. These are the main trends recorded since the 1970s.

With the turn of the century, the growth in job opportunities has not been keeping up with the growth in the labour force, especially among the youths. With the lack of financial unemployment benefits, this situation has contributed to disparities in living standards, and to the extension of the economic gaps between different social classes. This situation has led to the spread of informality among Egypt's youth hoping to financially sustain their families. Unemployment, informality and the deterioration of the quality of jobs have fuelled migration aspirations among the employed and unemployed youths alike.

Looking at the general profile of Egyptian emigrants, it can be concluded that average education among emigrants is higher than non-migrants (Roushdy et al, 2009). Wahba (2007) also states that there is an increased proportion of youths with high education attainment. These changes are explained by the increased proportion of educated youths in the labour force and the inability of the current labour demand to absorb these levels of education; the fact that led to marked deterioration of the investment returns in higher education in Egypt.

Education attainment influences the choice of destination and the jobs undertaken by emigrants in their destination countries. Given the competition Egyptian emigrants are facing with other nationalities, especially countries of southeast Asia, the occupational distribution of emigrants has been transformed, where the proportion of skilled migrants has increased with respect to the medium skills.

Another link between education and emigration is the brain drain. Two thirds of Egyptian migration is temporary, while the remaining third is permanent, which is highly populated by the educated youths. Economic studies, however, highlight the national development role of the migration of skills through the remittances (Zohry 2007; IOM 2010) and releasing the pressures on the Egyptian labour market. Moreover, the socio-economic characteristics of emigrants, compared to non-migrants, in Egypt is an incentive for further investments in education and skill accumulation, which reverses the negative impact of the brain drain.

Temporary and permanent migration in Egypt are geographically defined by the destination rather than the length of stay. This distinction in definition has emerged from the rights and benefits

accrued to Egyptian migrants during their stay. All Egyptian migration to Arab countries is temporary, where rights of citizenship will not be acquired with the longer stay. Migration to the West has been referred to as permanent migration, where, according to certain guidelines and procedures, a migrant can be granted the citizenship of the country of destination. Furthermore, migration to the west, known in this context as permanent migration, is heavily characterized by being a family migration. Therefore, the numbers of permanent migrants are not well represented in surveys due to the general absence of the whole family members.

Egyptian migration has been going through phases of process redefinition. The prominence of temporary migration as a phenomenon has appeared with the lengthy stay of Egyptians in Arab countries. Moreover, migration to the West has undergone further classification, where Egyptian migrants to Europe have recently been sharing similar characteristics to Egyptian migrants to the Arab countries. In this context, most of the Egyptian migration is temporary and most of the temporary migration is circular. Family migration has highly dominating migration flows to North America and Australia.

Gender balance has never been a feature of Egyptian migration. Rather, it is highly male dominated, whether permanent or temporary, and is circular. However, based on the data sets available, and by males and females comparison, some conclusions can be drawn. With respect to temporary migration, 72% of male migrants are in the Gulf, 14.47% in Jordan, and 9.31% in Arab countries. Of female migrants from Egypt, 69% go to the Gulf countries, 19.72% choose Jordan, and 2.82% reside in other Arab countries. Never married and married males are concentrated in the Gulf, where 64% (416) of unmarried and 74.42% (1673) of the married are concentrated in the Gulf countries, followed by Jordan where 15.58% (100) and 14.1% (317) of never married and married, respectively are residing. On the other hand, never married females are concentrated in Jordan, followed by the gulf countries, whereas married females are concentrated in the Gulf and the west.

In general, 46.6% (1300) of male temporary migrants have general/ technical secondary education, followed equally by illiterate (17%~480) and university graduates (15.46%~431). Approximately 75% (2097) of male temporary migrants had been employed before leaving Egypt, with the rest

being either unemployed (22.5%=627) or Out of Labour Force (2.26%=63). Male temporary migrants were highly (40%=851) employed in agriculture before migration as waged or non-waged workers (30%=642). Construction workers also form approximately 24% of temporary migrants. During migration, Egyptian males are heavily employed as construction workers (37.4%=1022) and to a lesser extent, in agriculture (11%=297).

Unmarried females are more biased towards the Arab countries with a temporary migration nature. The representation of unmarried female migrants is already very low, driven by the culture and the high immobility of women. 39% (13) of unmarried female migrants are with a university degree and 33% (11) with a general/ technical secondary degree.

6. Remittances

International remittances of Egyptians abroad are deemed the main positive consequence of migration. Egypt is one of the largest recipients of remittances in the world, coming fifth in line after India, China, Philippines and Mexico (Mohieldin & Ratha 2019). These remittances are one of the main sources of foreign currency in the Egyptian economy, contributing significantly to the Egyptian GDP.

Remittances are mainly used to finance consumption patterns of households, improving their economic standards. On the other hand, remittances are blamed for widening the economic gap between households receiving remittances and other non-receiving households. This inequality is exacerbated by the initial selection of emigrants being those who are financially able to afford it (McCormick & Wahba 2003; Roushdy et. al 2009). Therefore, the financially able ones receive remittances from their migrant family member, which further improves their economic status, widening the gap and increasing inequalities.

3. METHODOLOGY

Desk research is carried out at this stage of the project to achieve the primary objectives of the research, and to answer the questions posed. Academic research, reports of international

organizations, and statistics are analysed to provide answers to the research questions. National household surveys have been analysed for this purpose. These surveys include:

1. The Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey 2012 (ELMPS12)
2. Survey of Young People in Egypt 2009 and 2014 (SYPE09 and SYPE14)
3. The Jordanian Labour Market Panel Survey 2016 (JLMPS16)

The Egyptian and Jordanian Labour Market Panel Surveys are data collected by the ERF at different points in time. For Egypt, ELMPS has started in 1998 as a Labour Market Survey, following the example of the Labour Force Surveys by CAPMAS. Households and individuals have been adopted over the follow up rounds of the survey in 2002, 2006 & 2012. Currently, 2018 is a work in progress. A fresher sample and split households are added to every round, in addition to the old households and individuals. JLMPs is similar to the ELMPS in structure, however it has only two rounds, so far in 2010 and 2016. The two surveys are very rich in labour market information, in addition to modules on migration (domestic and international) as well as marriage and education. In addition to the panel nature of the survey, each survey separately, accounts for labour market retrospective data that allows following the labour market trajectories of the target individuals.

The Survey of Young People in Egypt, on the other hand, is a youth specific survey by the Population Council. The survey covers household surveys as well as youth specific individual surveys covering, for the first time, the slum areas of Egypt as well as frontier governorates (Sinai and the desert). The Survey has two rounds in a panel format, once in 2009 and the other was in 2014. The choice of timings is very relevant to the demographic stages of the youth in Egypt. In 2009, the youth bulge has started making its way through the working ages, in 2014, the bulge was all settled in the working-age population, and the echo of the bulge has started to sound. The two surveys have modules covering internal migration, previous migration experience, and more importantly, migration aspirations among youth. Additionally, the survey covers modules on the education, health, labour market and marriage covering the five life transitions of youths (World Development Report, 2006). In 2014, SYPE has added a new module on civic and political participation.

4. FINDINGS

7. Profile and characteristics of Egyptian migration to Jordan

The analysis of Egyptian migration to Jordan will take place on three axes, potential migrants, current migrants, and returning migrants. The previously mentioned surveys allowed for a close look on the three types of migrants that would allow a full comprehensive understanding of Egyptian migration trends to Jordan.

7.1. Potential migration to Jordan

Given the nature of Egyptian migration, and being a young people phenomenon, the Surveys of Young People in Egypt (2009 and 2014) have both discussed, not only current migration and return migration, but also aspirations to migrate, which matter more to young people. Studying these aspirations would help understand the drive behind them, and would also help formulate policies that address these aspirations.

The young age representation in SYPE has limited any previous experiences with migration. Accordingly, SYPE has extensively discussed aspirations to migrate among this young group. Out of 8000 individuals aged 18 and above (in both 2009 and 2014), 14.64% and 7.66%, respectively, intend to travel to another country to work, study or live abroad. Out of those potential migrants, 70.5% (75%) have chosen the Gulf countries as their aspired destination, followed by 19.7% (14%) choosing countries of the West (Europe, USA and Canada) in 2009 (2014). Only 3.2% of young potential migrants chose Jordan as their aspired country of destination in both 2009 and 2014.
The first determinant of aspirations and the choice of aspired destination country is related to the pull and push factors. The main push and pull factors fuelling aspirations to migrate among young people has not significantly changed between 2009 and 2014. This means that the circumstances young Egyptians were going through have not changed by the eruption of the uprisings. On the contrary, they persisted that they are the ones still fuelling their aspirations right after.

The main push factors are related to the financial and labour market situation in Egypt. 60% have reported that the unavailability of jobs in Egypt is their main push factor, whereas 40% have

reported that it is the higher incomes abroad, in addition to the bad living conditions in Egypt. Table 1 below shows the aspired destination country with respect to the main push factors in 2009 and 2014.

Table 1: Percentage aspiring destination country groups with respect to push factors

	Gulf		**West**		**Other Arab**		**Jordan**	
	2009	**2014**	**2009**	**2014**	**2009**	**2014**	**2009**	**2014**
No Job opportunities in Egypt	63.73%	60.46%	53.53%	57.25%	58.21%	69.77%	66.67%	56.52%
Income abroad higher than Egypt	39.63%	45.39%	46.06%	29.71%	46.27%	39.53%	51.28%	69.57%
Bad living conditions in Egypt	41.71%	48.58%	41.49%	42.75%	38.81%	37.21%	38.46%	65.22%
Escaping family pressures	2.55%	4.26%	8.71%	9.42%	5.97%	0%	2.56%	4.35%

To help family	17.27%	15.25%	9.13%	10.14%	37.31%	16.28%	33.33%	30.43%

Source: Author's own calculations from SYPE09 and SYPE14

Social, political and economic conditions have changed in Egypt between 2009 and 2014, the fact that had repercussions on the severity of the push factors and the changing significance on the different push factors. More Egyptian youth aspiring to migrate to the Gulf countries believe that incomes abroad are higher than in Egypt. The percentage however is significantly lower between the two periods for the young Egyptians aspiring to migrate to the West. Egyptian youth aspiring to migrate to Jordan see that escaping bad living conditions is more important in 2014 than it was in 2009.

The percentages of potential migrants choosing Jordan as an aspired destination have mainly reported the lack of jobs and the aspired higher income. On the pull factors, 90% of potential migrants choosing Jordan as aspired destination in 2009 choose gaining money as the main pull factor to Jordan. Moreover, 90% of potential migrants to Jordan have expressed their willingness to accept jobs not related to their education or specialization.

Egyptian migrants, among other nationalities, have been accepting jobs at destination countries that do not match their level of education or specialization. This is mainly due to an international skill mismatch between countries of origin and countries of destination. Migrants make their own selection where they believe their skill and education are appreciated and therefore the returns are suitable for the investment. However, with the lack of communication on skills required and skills supplied, the mismatch still persists and the gap is getting wider (Zohry 2013; Assaad and Barsoum, 2007).

This finding is supported by data from SYPE14, where among the young potential migrants, at least 70% of individuals aspiring migration are willing to work in jobs that mismatch their skills and specialization in the Gulf, other Arab countries and Jordan, while this percentage drops to 50% for countries of the West. Those youth willing to work in jobs different from current specialization or education are the ones with lower levels of education, mainly less than secondary and general

secondary education. They are also either employed in the private informal sector, or not working, either by being unemployed or out of the labour force. This finding is further supported by returnees who have reported working in a job that is less than their specialization or previous work in Egypt (42%) and this percentage is high across the Gulf and the other Arab countries.

7.2. Current migrants

The Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS2012), the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE2014) and the Jordanian Labour Market Panel Survey (JLMPS2016) are closely examined to understand the characteristics of current migrants in Jordan. ELMPS12 and SYPE14 provide information through the migrant household. JLMPS, on the other hand, provides information on Egyptians who are currently interviewed during their stay in Jordan.

Prior to exploring the data, a brief understanding of the migration to Jordan is due. Migrating to Jordan is highly attributed to the occupations and nationalities of migrant workers. For example, as Arabs, Egyptians have a closer cultural affiliation and share the language with Jordanians, which makes them more capable of communicating with their employers than their non-Arab counterparts. Despite these challenges facing non-Arab migrant workers, they are recently witnessing a surge in numbers in the job market as opposed to their Arab/Egyptian counterparts. The composition of migrant workers has changed significantly over time. Indeed, the number of Egyptians has more than doubled between 2000 and 2015, yet their share of the total has decreased. The largest increases in migrant workers to Jordan have come from Bangladesh, China, and the Philippines. About 96 per cent of migrant workers are males, with female migrant workers coming primarily from the Philippines and Bangladesh.

ELMPS12 shows that 2910 (95%) of the total current Egyptian migrants represented in the sample are males, 72% (2095) of the males ’current migrants are currently residing in a Gulf country, with 14.5% (421) in Jordan. Of the minimal female migrants ’representation in the survey (71 females), 70.27% (49) are in the Gulf, while 18.92% (14) are in Jordan. one of the main reasons leading to the under-representation of female migrants in the survey, is the whole family nature of the migration of females. Social and cultural barriers have worked together to reduce the mobility of Egyptian women and has limited migration reasons for family related issues. Given the nature of the survey and the procedure followed for following up on current migrants, females have not

appeared significantly in the survey. However, this representation aligns approximately with the national data on the female migration in Egypt.

According to the Jordanian Census of 2015, 636,270 Egyptians (523,634 males and 112,636 females) are residing in Jordan. Egyptians are mostly concentrated in the Amman governorate (390 thousand), followed by governorates of El Zarqa, Irbid and Balqa. Their Syrian counterparts in Jordan account for 1,265,514 (628,226 males and 637,288 females) and are mainly concentrated in Amman governorate (436 thousand), followed by Irbid (343 thousand), El Mafraq (208 thousand) and El Zarqa (175 thousand). The majority of migrant workers are in Jordan without their families and for a limited period of time. This applies to Egyptian migrant workers (Leading Point, 2016). However, the majority of Syrian refugees have fled to Jordan with their families (Krafft et al, 2018).

With respect to the demographic characteristics, it can be noted that Egyptian migrants to the Gulf countries, other Arab countries and more specifically Jordan are generally of a younger age. They are mainly concentrated around the 20-40 years age groups. Moreover, 76.64% of current migrants in the JLMPS16 survey are married. A closer look into the details shows that percentages change is based on the destination country group. Almost 80% of the migrants in the Gulf countries (both males and females) are married. This marriage percentage drops for the Western countries, where 64% of current Egyptian migrants are married.

The percentage of married Egyptian migrants in Jordan is higher than the rest of the Arab countries, but lower than the Gulf. Among the married males, 74% (1673) are concentrated in the Gulf, while only 8% (181) in the other Arab countries and 14% (317) in Jordan, compared to only 3.42% (77) in the West. The unmarried males, on the other hand are less concentrated in the Gulf countries (64.8% and 416 males) and with a more similar distribution between Jordan (15.58% and 100 males) and the other Arab countries (13.71% and 88 males). A low representation of males in countries of the west is experienced for both married (3.42% and 77 males) and unmarried (5.3% and 34 males) males. The reasons behind this low representation differ between the married and unmarried males. Given the nature of migration to the West and mainly referring to migration to North America and Australia, being a permanent migration, it takes place in a family context.

Therefore, and given the nature of the survey and the procedure followed for data collection on current migration, no enough information is available on permanent migrants to these countries. The limited available information on current migrants in Europe, highlights the relatively more temporary and circular nature of this migration. On the other hand, given the restriction on visa entry and legal framework followed for the migration of unmarried males to the west, it is therefore underrepresented in the survey.

Among females, both dependants and migrant workers, ELMPS12 shows that the married ones are concentrated in the Gulf, with very small representation in the West countries, while there is absence of representation in the other Arab countries or Jordan. The representation of females in the sample and the geographical distribution of those females is another reference to the nature of Egyptian migration. Migration to the West is considered a mixed migration between family and individual. Migration to North America and Australia, is mainly considered family and permanent migration, while migration to Europe is still considered an individual and temporary/ circular one. The permanent and family nature of migration to countries of North America and Australia (West) has reduced the representation of these migrants in any samples, due to their limited existence in Egypt, both for them and for any of their family members. This is in addition to the lengthy stay abroad in a family context, where living details are not available for any remaining family member in Egypt. On the other hand, the representation of women in the Gulf migration highlights the emergence of this temporary migration as a family migration. This sheds light on the evolving nature of migration in Egypt, where family migration to the Gulf is getting more significant. Migration to other Arab countries, on the other hand, remains to be highly individual migration.

Unmarried females represent only around 1.2% of the total migrants in the survey. These unmarried females either represent females accompanying their families (Fathers instead of husbands in this context) or worker migrants. The unmarried females are highly concentrated in the Gulf countries (44% and 16 females) and Jordan (39% and 14 females). However, by examining countries as opposed to country groups, it can be concluded that Jordan is one of the main destinations for unmarried worker female migrants, with approximately 39% of the unmarried females in the survey currently living in Jordan, followed by 11% in Saudi Arabia, however highly dominated by females accompanying families.

It would be interesting to compare the attractiveness of Jordan to unmarried women of other nationalities, however, data limitation made it quite difficult to reach this conclusion. However, coming closer to a similar finding is the representation of the different nationalities by gender and marital status in Jordan using JLMPS. Equal gender representation of migrants from Syria, the Gulf, Asia and the Middle East is concluded. However, migration to Jordan from Egypt is male dominated, and from North Africa and the Non-Arab countries is female dominated. The representation of migrants from North Africa and Non-Arab countries of the total migrants in Jordan is very minimal (combined, they form less than 1% if Syrians are included and 1.5% if Syrians are excluded. Approximately 33% (including Syrians) of female migration to Jordan is of single females. This percentage goes up to 39% when Syrians are excluded.

Figure 1 below shows the proportional distribution of region of origin in Egypt by the destination country groups. Migrants to the gulf come from almost all areas of Egypt, with the highest percentage coming from rural lower and upper Egypt. The same applies to migrants in Jordan.

Figure 4: Proportional distribution of Egyptians by area of origin and destination



Source: Author's own calculations using ELMPS12

Regarding the role of migrant networks, 89% of the households with a current migrant have mentioned that he/she is in direct contact and speaks regularly with the household members. This contact acts as a proxy for the use of the migrant networks which can help find a job and provide support to the recently arriving Egyptian migrants. Among these, 14% are living in Jordan, with 72% in the Gulf. This information is important for two reasons; first, it adds confidence in the data collected and provided by a household member about the current migrant member. The second reason is this connection that will stimulate aspirations to migrate among other members of the household to the same country of destination.

With regards to education, ELMPS12 shows that Egyptian females with higher levels of education (university and above) are concentrated only in the Gulf countries and countries of the West. While females with general or vocational secondary education are divided equally between countries of the Gulf and other Arab countries. Jordan appears to be the single destination attracting most of the females with general/ vocational secondary education. These results are further confirmed for the younger age group through findings summarized from SYPE14.

Males with higher levels of education (graduates of middle/ higher institutes and university) are mainly concentrated in the Gulf countries, shaping the composition of Egyptian migrants to the

Gulf countries as relatively higher skills migration. Male migrants to Jordan, however, are more of the lower levels of education, where 22% of the uneducated and 16% of less than secondary and the general/ vocational secondary graduates choose Jordan, compared to other countries in the Arab region. This shows the attraction of Jordan to the relatively lower skills.

Egyptian labour migrants are mainly concentrated in three job sectors in Jordan, the agricultural sector, the construction sector and the service sector. Much of the job segmentation is not based on education or skills, but rather on nationality. Despite the perception that Egyptians bring special skills to the sector, they usually do not own any vocational training advantage over Jordanians or other non-Jordanian migrant workers (i.e Syrians, for example) in such sectors (Razzaz, 2017).

Egyptian migrants to Jordan mainly come from the private informal sector in Egypt (51%). In addition to the private informal sector, 38% of current Egyptian migrants in Jordan were involved as unpaid family workers or were unemployed in Egypt before migration. Looking at the situation of those individuals in Jordan, current Egyptian migrants in the sample are equally represented in the private sector, formal and informal, with a smaller percentage being unemployed. Table 2 below shows the occupational change of current Egyptian migrants in Jordan, compared to the situation back in Egypt.

Table 2: Occupational change upon migration

	Employment in Jordan			
		Private formal sector n (%)	**Private informal sector n (%)**	**Unemployed n (%)**
Employment before migration	**Private formal sector**	0 0%	3 100%	0 0%
	Private informal sector	67 44.44%	84 55.56%	0 0%
	Unpaid family work	21 38.38%	21 38.18%	13 23.64%
	Employer/ self employed	14 42.42%	19 57.58%	0 0%
	Unemployed	47 60.26%	28 35.9%	3 3.85%
	Out of Labour Force	2 100%	0 0%	0 0%

Source: Author's own calculations using ELMPS12.

Examining the incomes of the current migrants, and how they impact migration, it can be seen that the average income of Egyptians living in the West is the highest, compared to other regions. Looking more closely at the separate countries, we find that the average income of Egyptians abroad has reached its highest limits in Lebanon, followed by Italy, Netherlands, France, UAE, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Looking at the average income in relation to education levels at the different destination country groups, the frequency of migrants represented in the sample play a significant role in the frequencies and size of incomes. The existence of outliers further shifts the ordinal nature of the countries with highest incomes for Egyptian migrants. For example, the number of Egyptian migrants in Lebanon represented in the survey,

together with their education and skill level, shows that incomes of Egyptians in Lebanon represented in this sample are considered outliers, with no specific implications or general conclusions. It can be concluded that the countries with the highest average income are the countries with the majority of Egyptian migrants are of general/ vocation education or university and above education. The lower the education level of the migrant, the lower the average income earned. Figure 2 below shows the average income of current Egyptian migrants by destination country groups.

Figure 5: Average income of Egyptian migrants by education level and destination country group



Source: Author's own calculations using ELMPS12.

The figure represented above refers to the wide gap in earnings between the lower levels of education and the higher ones, especially in Jordan and the other Arab countries. Looking more deeply at the occupations taken by migrants of every educational level in the country of destination, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Approximately 60% (125) of general and technical secondary graduates in Jordan are employed as construction workers. This percentage increases to approximately 65% among university- and post-graduates. In the western countries of destination, however, approximately 45% of university and above education are employers, managers, engineers, teachers and accountant supervisors and over 71% are employed as construction workers and technicians.

This occupational variation shows the concentration of the skills in jobs that appreciate these skills. In Jordan, both medium and high levels of education are employed in the same occupations, while in the West, migrants of different levels of education are employed where their skills are of significance. The situation of university and above graduates is what deserve the attention. Working in occupations that are considered a downgrade for their skills and education shows how desperate these migrants are and would therefore accept any job regardless of its income. This could be one explanation why average income among the university and above graduates are lower than those of the general/ technical secondary graduates. Another reason that could explain this variation in incomes in favour of lower education in Jordan is the limited number of educated migrants in Jordan. Skills are not appreciated well enough, and therefore, the country is not attractive enough to the migrants of higher levels of education.

This finding matches well the theory of human capital, where the returns to education increases when the education level is higher, and thus, the larger is the investment in human capital. On the other hand, reverse causality exists in this finding with regards to Egyptians in Jordan. Are incomes on average lower in Jordan and therefore, it manages to attract the lower levels of education, or is it because the majority of the Egyptian migrants in Jordan are of lower education levels, then their incomes are less on average? This result is further supported by a positive and significant (at the 5%) correlation between education and average income for Egyptians in Jordan. This positive and significant correlation indicate a strong relationship between both variables, however it does not explain the flow of the relationship.

Looking at the profile of current migrants represented in the SYPE14, at least 70% of the current migrants in Jordan (as well as other Arab countries) had less than sufficient or insufficient finances before their migration started. This percentage significantly drops for migrants in the Gulf, or western countries.

JLMPS16 provides another view of the situation of Egyptians in Jordan. ELMPS and SYPE provide insights on Egyptian migrants in multiple destination countries and try to study their situation before and after the migration episode, and through their community, their current situation. JLMPS focuses on the comparative situation of Egyptians in their destination country.

Table 3 below shows the percentage distribution of the different nationalities in Jordan as of 2016, along with demographic and socio-economic characteristics.

Table 3: Socio-economic characteristics of migrants to Jordan

Nationality	Frequency	Percentage of foreign nationality	Average Age	Proportion of males	Average Wealth Quintile	Average years of schooling
Jordanian	28398	n.a	25.9	50.27%	3.27	8.98
Egypt	322	6.38%	30.16	77.33%	1.4	6.85
Syria	2917	57.81%	19.9	49.33%	1.27	5.24
Gulf	219	4.5%	32.8	48.46%	3.71	11.02
Non-Arab	19	0.38%	27.84	36.84%	3.26	11.37
Asia	94	1.86%	20.64	52.13%	1.67	1.17
North Africa	11	0.22%	27.27	18.18%	3.72	9.8
Middle East	1455	28.83%	23.4	52.85%	2.3	7.86

Source: Author's own calculations using JLMPS16.

Table 3 above confirms, using JLMPS16 that the representation of Egyptians in the foreign nationalities in Jordan is the third highest country after Syria and Palestine. The Middle East is the highest represented region, and it is highly inflated by the Palestinians. It can also be noted that Egyptian migrants in Jordan are among the eldest compared to the other nationalities and with the highest representation of males. The economic situation of Egyptians and Syrians in Jordan, on the other hand, are among the worst. On average, Egyptians and Syrians are more represented in the lowest 20% of the wealth distribution, when compared to the nationals and other nationalities who are highly present in the top 40% of the wealth distribution. This is also in addition to the low education attainment among the Egyptian and Syrian migrants in Jordan compared to other nationalities. This finding with respect to education and wealth quintiles add to the reverse causality relationship with regards to Egyptians in Jordan.

With regards to the type of migrant households. Table 4 below shows the distribution of types of households by nationalities of current migrants in Jordan. Compared to the nationals, 87% of Egyptians share similar living arrangements, as compared to only 35% of Syrians. The remaining Egyptians are living in vulnerable conditions comparable to the majority of Syrians.

Table 4: The type of households where nationals and migrants live in Jordan, by migrants country groups.

Type of Household	Jordan	Egypt	Syria	Gulf	Non-Arab	Asia	North Africa	ME
Apartment	47.45	50.32	27.8	86.78	84.21	30.85	100	40.76
House	50.47	36.65	7.2	11.45	15.79	23.4	0	57.39
Villa	0.8	0	0.03	1.76	0	2.13	0	0
Hut	0.44	0.93	24.10	0	0	24.47	0	0.21
Temporary shelter	0.13	0	10.35	0	0	8.51	0	0.07
Guard room	0	4.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
Room in a building	0	1.55	0	0	0	0	0	0
Workshop	0	3.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caravan	0	0	29.5	0	0	0	0	0
Tent	0	0	0	0	0	10.64	0	0
Roof	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.37

Source: Author's own calculations using JLMPS16

The educational attainment and the current labour market status of the migrants of different nationalities show diverse distribution, especially with respect to nationals. Table 5 below shows the education level of nationals, as well as migrants of different nationalities. The percentage of individuals with no education is highly inflated among the nationals, as well as the international

migrants. The more educated migrants are represented in the Gulf and Western nationalities. Migrants from Egypt and Syria, alike, are more on the lower levels of educational attainment. However, the proportion of post-secondary educated individuals is the highest among Egyptian migrants.

Table 5: Education attainment of nationals and migrants in Jordan, by migrants country groups

Education	Jordan	Egypt	Syria	Gulf	Non-Arab	Asia	North Africa	ME
No education	43.33	53.77	84.33	36.14	31.25	96.88	40	58.35
Basic education	24.75	13.62	7.19	10.4	0	1.56	0	20.7
Vocational	0.29	3.23	0.05	0	0	0	0	1.25
Secondary	012.93	15.05	5.28	13.37	18.75	1.56	40	9.68
Post-secondary	5.68	10.04	1	5.45	0	0	0	3.92
University	11.30	4.3	2.09	28.71	43.75	0	20	5.76
Post-graduate	1.31	0	0.05	5.94	6.25	0	0	0.33

Source: Author's own calculations using JLMPS16.

Table 6, below, shows the distribution of the nationals and migrants across the different sectors of the economy. Jordanian women are highly inactive with a participation rate of 8%. They are highly represented in the unpaid family work, the private formal sector and the public sector. Nationals are highly represented in the "out of the labour force" group, excluding current students, they

represent 50% of the labour force and 76% of them are women. Among the economically active ones, nationals are mainly represented in the public (13%) and private formal (7.6%) sectors.

Migrants are highly concentrated in the private sector, both formal and informal. Egyptian migrants form the highest representation in the private sector, followed by migrants from other Arab countries. Syrians, on the other hand dominate the category of employers and self-employed.

Table 6: The distribution of the nationals and migrants across the different sectors of the economy, by migrants country groups

Employment	Jordan	Egypt	Syria	Gulf	Non-Arab	Asia	North Africa	ME
Public sector	21.02	4.03	0.14	2.29	0	0	0	2.7
Private formal sector	12.15	54.58	5.06	4	13.33	32.79	0	10.99
Private informal sector	2.14	6.59	3.01	0.57	0	0	0	3.51
Unpaid family work	0.19	0.37	0.05	0	0	0	0	0.09
Employer/ self employed	3.56	1.1	0.57	2.29	0	3.28	0	3.78
Unemployed	9.98	1.47	6.74	4	0	0	0	6.22
Out of labour force	50.95	31.87	84.42	86.86	86.67	62.93	100	72.7

Source: Author's own calculations using JLMPS16.

In addition to the employment sector and the labour market status, tables 10 and 11 show the number of working days per week and the number of working hours per day, as well as the stability of the job, respectively. Following the Asians, Egyptians appear to be among the overworked groups, with an average of 6.26 days per week and 9.49 hours per day. Breaking down the average days per week and hours per day, JLMPS16 shows that while 40% of Egyptians work 7-8 hours, however, 30% work 10 hours per day and 8% work 1 hours per day. These numbers are 18% and 8% extra days and hours, respectively, compared to nationals and 18% and 22% extra days and hours, respectively, compared to Syrians. Moreover, compared to Syrians, Egyptians are having more stable and permanent jobs and with rates highly comparable to nationals. The representation of seasonal and casual workers among the Syrians is the highest though, reaching 37%, compared to 10% for both Jordanians and Egyptians. Despite the lack of data confirming this finding, but it is believed that with time, Syrians were able to settle and sort out their lives, therefore establish more stable jobs. However, 78.7% and 91.7% of Egyptians work with no access to social security or medical insurance, respectively. This shows that working conditions for Egyptians is slightly higher than that of the Syrians, however, significantly less than the situation for the nationals.

The analysis of the situation of current Egyptian migrants in Jordan is very similar between the data and information collected from community back in Egypt and from the sample of Egyptians currently in Jordan. The distribution of Egyptian migrants in Jordan with respect to education and labour market participation is highly similar. The data collected from Jordan, allowed for the comparison of the situation of Egyptians in Jordan with the situation of Syrians which are considered the main competitive group to Egyptian migrants. With the start of the war, Syrians have moved to different neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries. However, the data from JLMPS shows that Syrians in Jordan are amongst the most vulnerable group of Syrians who have fled their country with the start of the War. This is confirmed by looking at the wealth distribution of Syrians currently living in Jordan at the time of the survey, where 81% of Syrians belong to the poorest wealth quintile. However, given the similarity between Egyptian and Syrian education systems and skills, the competition is expected to increase and become fiercer. Hence, for Egyptians to maintain their status in the Jordanian labour market, an upgraded and diversified skills profile of Egyptians is required, in addition to the increased resilience and diligence among Egyptian workers already in Jordan.

7.3. Egyptian returnees from Jordan

This section of the report encompasses the assessment of Egyptian migrants (current and returnees) who have been interviewed about their migration experience. The problem with this analysis is the limited information shared, as it is within a historical trajectory of the migrant and thus, limited questions have been posed to the interviewee. Selectivity bias also exists, as those individuals were either on a temporary return on a vacation in Egypt during the time of the survey, in transit before moving to another destination, or have already returned and terminated their migration episode. Drawing conclusions from this sample needs to take into consideration this selection bias. Migrants who are on vacation, or who have voluntarily returned to Egypt are of a different wealth and financial stability compared to the ones who are still in their countries of destination. Therefore, collecting data on previous migration experience could be affected by the reason for return, or the physical availability in Egypt at the time of the survey. However, this module is considered the only source of information that addresses returnees to Egypt whether temporarily or permanently. Therefore, the data will be used to draw conclusions, however these conclusions are drawn very cautiously.

Among those interviewed and represented in ELMPS12, 96% are males. 98.67% of males have migrated for work reasons, while females have migrated to accompany a family member. The data from ELMPS12 shows that three waves of migration to Jordan took place, one in the early 1980s, the second in the mid 1990s and the third was an extended phase, ranging from 2005 to 2011. Jordan is known for its high turnover of migrant workers, although some have lived there for many years. Therefore, migration of Egyptians to Jordan appears to be a temporary migration, where the average range of stay is from 1 to 5 years. All 233 Egyptians recorded in the survey, who have migrated to Jordan at an earlier stage in life, have left Jordan within this time range, 95% of them went back to Egypt and stayed there and the remaining 5% have moved to Libya, Lebanon, Iraq and Germany. The choice of country for re-emigration is not surprising as we have referred to in earlier sections of this report that average incomes in those countries are higher than in Jordan.

Among the Egyptian returnees, 90% have either no education or a maximum of general secondary education. Before migration, they were heavily involved in the private informal sector, unpaid

family work or were unemployed and out of labour force. Returned from Jordan, they are currently heavily involved in the private informal sector or as employers/ self-employed. Table 7 below shows the occupational change of Egyptian migrants to Jordan before migration and upon return. A point of interest is the economic activity of migrants who were either unemployed or out of the labour force before migrating to Jordan. Among the unemployed and the out of labour force, 27% of each group have joined the public sector upon return. Examining education, age, length of stay in Jordan and the economic activity in Jordan, it can be concluded that this group is a young group of males, aged 20-25, with general/ vocational secondary education with an average stay of 1-2 years and were mainly employed in the private informal sector in Jordan. These findings could refer to the popularity of the public sector among Egyptian youths. Approximately 52% of this group were newly unemployed or out of the labour force, back to their very first job status after which they have migrated to Jordan. The remaining 48% have had a previous job experience as unpaid family workers or in the private informal sector before the episode of unemployment and migration. This analysis shows that the previously unemployed or out of labour force have been waiting and looking for a government job. Waiting for long, they travelled to Jordan till they were able to secure one and return for it. Their income group (45% of unemployed belong to the richest 20% and 57% of the out of labour force belong to the top 20%) has allowed them to tolerate the wait for the public sector job and to engage in a temporary migration to Jordan until a public sector job is secured.

Table 7: Occupational change of Egyptians before migration to Jordan and after return from Jordan

		After return						
Before migra-tion		**Public sector N %**	**Private formal N %**	**Private informal N %**	**Unpaid family work N %**	**Employer/ self employed N %**	**Unemployed N %**	**Out of Labour Force N %**
	Public N %	0 0%	0 0%	3 75%	0 0%	0 0%	1 25%	0 0%

	Private formal **N** **%**	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
	Private informal **N** **%**	1 1.43%	2 2.86%	47 67.14%	0 0%	13 18.57%	6 8.57%	1 1.43%
	Unpaid family work **N** **%**	2 6.25%	0 0%	9 28.12%	7 21.88%	11 34.38%	2 6.25%	1 3.12%
	Employer/ self employed **N** **%**	0 0%	0 0%	1 20%	0 0%	3 60%	0 0%	1 20%
	Unemployed **N** **%**	13 27.08%	0 0%	20 41.67%	3 6.25%	9 18.75%	3 6.25%	0 0%
	Out of Labour Force **N** **%**	6 27.27%	1 4.55%	5 22.73%	1 4.55%	4 18.18%	4 18.18%	1 4.55%

Source: Author's own calculations using ELMPS12

The findings of this table show that entrepreneurship is a common activity upon return across all labour market participations in the pre migration situation. Moreover, Egyptians who had previously been employed in the public sector have not returned to the public sector. These results confirm the economic studies on return migration and entrepreneurial activities. The accumulation of skills and finances abroad allows returnees to become self-employed and employers.

Among Egyptian returnees from Jordan, 62% have reported that they managed to save money while abroad. Therefore, and believing in the role of savings along with experience accumulated abroad, returnees are expected to become entrepreneurs. Not only do the percentage of savers prove the theoretical belief of the occupational change of returnees, it can also be noted that the

returnees employed in the private informal sector and as employers or self-employed are the ones who have accumulated larger savings value compared to other occupations.

Among Egyptian returnees, 82% have originally migrated to look for a job (as unemployed seeking a job or employed but looking for a better job). The remaining 18% are highly driven by financial reasons. Among the returnees, 70% were having financial issues, where finances were either less than sufficient, or not sufficient to buy the basic needs. Moreover, 80% of returnees have stated that their very last pay received before return was higher than their pay before migration and 37% of them say that their last income before returning was 2-5 times higher than their income before migration, with 29% reporting at least 5 times higher.

Remittances act as the main incentive to migration. 64% of Egyptian returnees from Jordan have reported that during their stay, they sent remittances to the family. Remittances were sent either regularly or irregularly, with a larger portion sending remittances in an irregular way. It can be noted that the average amount of remittances sent irregularly is higher than the regular ones. A significant positive correlation exists between the amount of monthly remittances made by Egyptians living in Jordan and the financial sufficiency of the family household before migration.

When asked about the reasons of return, 28% of Egyptian returnees from Jordan have reported poor working conditions as the main reason for return. Other reasons of leaving include getting married, the end of the employment contract and the wish to return.

Given the young age of the sampled individuals in SYPE14, the proportion of returnees is so minimal that no major conclusions can be drawn. Also, given the permanency of migration to the West, when compared to migration to the Gulf or to other Arab countries, none of the returnees represented has been residing in the West.

Half of the individuals who have reported a previous migration experience have already migrated before 2009. Characteristics of this group and the migration experience are being accounted for in the 2009 SYPE. Those who migrated after 2009 are accounted for in the SYPE14. According to SYPE09 and SYPE14 previous migrants were mainly residing in the Gulf and other Arab

countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and Libya. Only 6% (11%) of previous migrants before the year 2009 (after 2009) have reported a previous destination being Jordan. According to SYPE09 the main reported push factor fuelling migration was family reunification reasons, which again is expected, given their very young age. This finding has been supported by the most selected pull factor by this group, which is the existence of relatives and family in this country of destination. This shows that given the young age of the sample, migration for work does not yet act as the main determinant of migration, but rather accompanying family (parents given their young age).

According to SYPE14, migration for work opportunities has appeared to be the main element fueling migration. This finding is supported by the main push factors of previous migrants in general and previous migrants residing in Jordan. The main push factors are classified as available job opportunities, better income, saving for marriage and financially helping family members. Having a job offer and gaining money for marriage are considered the main push factors among previous migrants generally, and those residing in Jordan specifically.

However, given this young age, circular migration matters more than return migration for this group. SYPE14 shows that among the 130 returnees captured in the survey, at least 60% would want to migrate again, they either want to return to Jordan or to migrate but to another destination. A very minimal portion of returnees has chosen to stay in Egypt for good. The majority of returnees aspiring migration choose the same old destination, this reduces the costs of migration, both the financial and psychological ones. However, 50% of returnees from Jordan aspire to move to the Gulf countries in their next migration cycle. Only 2% of returnees who want to re-emigrate have chosen the West as the aspired destination, and they have returned from an Arab country.

7.4. Status of Egyptians in Jordan after the Syrian Crisis

One of the most striking features of the labour market is that the working conditions identified by Jordanians as important in any job – whatever the sector or occupation – put them in a disadvantageous competition with migrant workers and Syrian refugees. In interviews with non-Jordanian workers in an ILO report (Razzaz 2017), late-payment of wages, non-payment of overtime, long and unpredictable working hours, and heavy reliance on low-productivity physically demanding methods were found to be the norm. In agriculture and domestic work,

payment delays of several months were common. While payment of overtime is well-enforced in parts of the manufacturing sector, workers in tourism and other sectors are often not compensated. In all sectors, 13 working hours per day are common and in agriculture and construction Egyptians often work as night guards. This finding is well supported by data from JLMPS reported in previous section, where it is common for Egyptians in Jordan to work more than 12 hours per day.

Despite the challenges, there are several opportunities associated with incorporating refugees. First, Syrians are already resident in the country, so many of the upfront costs of recruitment can be eliminated. Second, despite the generally low levels of education, many Syrians have strong entrepreneurial skills as well as skills in trade (particularly in construction and services). Third, while migrant workers send the bulk of their wages back home as remittances, the Jordanian economy benefits from the multiplier effect of Syrian wages being spent inside Jordan. Fourth, there may be opportunities to recruit Syrians living in camps, who have their basic needs provided by the camp, to work in nearby manufacturing companies.

Migration patterns have changed at the mark of 2011, when Egypt has gone through the political and economic instability consequential of the uprisings. Before 2011, the Egyptian migrants to Jordan were mainly of no education or secondary education (general/ vocational). The proportion of Egyptian migrants to Jordan with no education has significantly decreased at the mark of 2011 with a significant increase in the proportion of migrants with a university degree.

Before 2011, Egyptian migrants to Jordan were mainly employed (87%) before migration, while the rest had been unemployed. At the mark of 2011, the composition of Egyptian migrants to Jordan has changed with 60% being employed, 38.6% unemployed and 1.68% out of labour force. This has changes the face of the Egyptian migration profile upon the eruption of the uprisings. On the other hand, the labour market situation of Egyptian migrants in Jordan has seen no change between the two periods. The percentage representation of Egyptians in Jordan in different sectors, jobs and occupations has not marked significant change. On the positive side, however, the average monthly income of Egyptian migrants in Jordan has increased between the two periods.

In reaction to the 2011 uprisings, migratory patterns and flows are expected to change with the political and economic stability. The data however shows that at least 70% have reported that the 2011 uprisings have not changed their migration plans, where they have already started thinking about migrating before the uprisings. The instability occurring through the revolution is expected to impact labour market status of migrants. Accordingly, half of previous migrants reported that they have either completely lost their jobs, working part time or with a lower salary.

5. MIGRATION AND LABOUR POLICIES IN JORDAN

Measures taken throughout the 1990s included giving incentives to employers to hire locals and to enact the 1996 Labour Law, whereby progressive restrictions were placed on foreigners, which prohibited their employment in almost all economic sectors, except in the building sector, domestic services, cleaning and in agriculture. As early as 1984, it became mandatory for Egyptians to hold residency permits and for all migrant workers in Jordan to have valid work permits, for which they were required to pay an annual fee or risk deportation. Over the past five years, in order to discourage business owners from employing foreign workers, and in an effort to provide funds for the training of Jordanians, Jordanian authorities have increased the fees levied on foreign workers significantly.

Until then, Arab workers enjoyed quasi-free access to Jordan, as well as to the Jordanian work market. In the name of pan-Arabism, existing regulations were left non-enforced for Arabs, especially Egyptians, the biggest community of Arab expatriates in the country.

A government project unveiled in mid-2006 was to raise the fees for non-Arabs from 450 US$ to between US $900 and US $1300 and the fees for Arab workers from US $200 to between US $500 and US $700 (IRIN 2006). Increases actually did not reach such high levels: the fee for Egyptians, for instance, was 285$ by mid-2007 (De Bel-Air 2007).

Currently, the mechanisms used to import manpower are increasingly monitored by the highest political authorities in Jordan. Decision making processes regarding immigration and employment are monitored by the King and the government ministries (the Labour Ministry coordinates with other public sector institutions for the implementation of the process, as well as with semi-public

investment promotion corporations, investors and business owners). Regular bilateral agreements, furthermore, govern the entry of each nationality into the Jordanian labour market, design employment conditions and minimum salaries, among other things. For instance, since 1999, work contracts must be obtained before departure from the Jordanian diplomatic and economic representations in the country of origin (De Bel-Air 2007). These measures, on the one hand, aim to link new immigration flows to job offers, on the other hand, they involve sending countries in Jordanian immigration policies so as to better control immigration flows for increased security and better management. Efforts are also made by the ministries involved in the design and control of immigration patterns and policies (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Labour) to provide estimates pertaining to the actual figures and location of foreign workers, legal and illegal, and to enforce work permits' fees collection and, most importantly, to regularize illegal workers (De Bel-Air 2007). For instance, in order for the Egyptian Embassy in Amman to help Egyptian irregular migrant workers settle their situation, an agreement was passed between Egyptian and Jordanian Labour ministers in July 2007 (De Bel-Air 2007). Jordanian authorities and the Egyptian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding in March 2007 that established basic operating procedures for temporary Egyptian labourers to enter Jordan (primarily in the agricultural Jordan Valley) with labour contracts, medical screening, and entry visa fees (De Bel-Air 2007).

6. TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN JORDAN

The Labour Law treats all non-Jordanians equally in terms of requiring permission of the Ministry of Labour in order to work. While operating within this legal framework, the Government of Jordan has recognized the special situation of Syrians as refugees rather than as migrant workers and has developed regulations accordingly. The Government has given priority to Syrian refugees by temporarily restricting the entry of new migrant workers, and by reducing work permit fees for Syrians to JOD 10 (Tobin & Alahmed 2019). Equally important, the Government has created a pilot programme through which Syrians can obtain work permits in agriculture that allow them to move among multiple employers (Razzaz 2017). Although additional challenges will be faced in other sectors, the programme serves as a useful model for internal labour market flexibility that can be adapted more broadly.

7. CONCLUSION

This report has attempted to gather information collected from different data sources, from the Egyptian and the Jordanian sides alike. Data on migration has always acted as the main constraint to any quantitative analysis on Egyptian migration. The currently available data has allowed, to a great extent, to formulate an understanding of Egyptian migration to Jordan as the main destination of interest for the sake of this report. However, for further understanding and where appropriate, comparison to migration to other destinations, as well as comparison with other nationalities in Jordan serve to enrich the findings.

It can be concluded that Jordan is one of the main destinations for Egyptian migrants in the Arab Region. Migration to Jordan is rather for a short period, emphasising its temporary nature. Migration to Jordan is considered a step in the lifetime of Egyptian migrants, where they either stay for a couple of years to accumulate savings that would allow them to further migrate to other regions, or to go back to Egypt and start their own businesses, being the most prevalent paths for Egyptian returnees from Jordan.

Looking at the profile of Egyptian migrants to Jordan, it is mainly migration of young individual males, with less representation of females or married males (they still exist but in smaller numbers). Lower education levels and lower skill levels dominate the pool of Egyptian migrants to Jordan. Egyptian migrants, when compared to other nationalities, work for longer hours and mainly represented in sectors with harsh working conditions. Migrant networks considerably facilitate the migration of Egyptians to Jordan, finding a job and a residence.

Finally, Egyptian migration to Jordan is considered one of the most important migration flows for Egyptians. The proximity of Jordan and the easier Arabic language dialect facilitate this flow. Furthermore, the demand for Egyptians, as opposed to other nationalities has ensured this continuation of flows. In the recent years, the number of Syrians in Jordan has increased significantly. The impact of this increase on the situation of Egyptians has only been analysed based on case by case evaluation. No quantitative or qualitative data has been collected to assess the most recent situation of Egyptians in Jordan in light of the political turbulence in the region,

shifting the demographic compositions of different nationalities in the region. Therefore, and for the significance of Jordan in the migration context of Egypt, further studies, both quantitative and qualitative are recommended for better assessment of the status quo and the prediction of the future of Egyptians in Jordan as a main destination country for Egyptians in the region.

8. REFERENCES

Assaad, R and Krafft, C. (2013) The Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey: Introducing the 2012 Round. Economic Research Forum. Cairo: Egypt. http://www.erfdataportal.com/index.php/citations/1

Assaad, R and Barsoum, G. (2007) Youth Exclusion in Egypt: In Search of'Second Chances'. Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper No 2. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087429

CAPMAS (2017) Labour Force Survey. http://www.erfdataportal.com/index.php/catalog/136

CAPMAS (2017) National Population Census.

McCormick, B and Wahba, J (2003) Return International Migration and Geographical Inequality: The Case of Egypt. Journal of African Economies. 12(4).

De Bel-Air, F. (2007) State Policies on Migration and Refugees in Jordan. The American University in Cairo. http://schools.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Documents/Francoise%20de%20Belair.pdf

ILO (2010) Labour Force Survey. https://www.ilo.org/surveydata/index.php/catalog/362/study-description

IOM (2011) Migration and Development in Egypt. International Organization for Migration. Cairo, Egypt. https://egypt.iom.int/sites/default/files/Migration%20and%20Development%20in%20Egypt%20-%20Facts%20and%20Figures%202011.pdf

IOM (2010) A Study on Remittances and Investment Opportunities for Egyptian Migrants. International Organization for Migration. Cairo, Egypt. https://egypt.iom.int/sites/default/files/Remittances%20and%20Investment%20Opportunities%20for%20Egyptian%20Migrants.pdf

IRIN (2006) Government Aims to 'Jordanize' labour Force. Jordan Times. https://www.jordantimes.com/archive/2006-05-25

El-Laithy, H., Lokshin, M. and Banerji, A (2003) Poverty and Economic Growth in Egypt, 1995-2000. Journal of African Studies and Development. 2(6): 150-165. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23549561_Poverty_and_Economic_Growth_in_Egypt_19952000

Leading Point (2016). Migrant Workers Study Report. Amman, Jordan. https://jordankmportal.com/resources/migrant-workers-study-report

Mohieldin, M and Ratha, D (2019) Migration Myths vs. Economic Facts. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-compact-opposition-migration-development-by-mahmoud-mohieldin-and-dilip-ratha-2019-02?fbclid=IwAR2uyVNsPrlzu0_RQCfocH6j2Jl6WbuNwZLbihj8FNF4v2OSQ0eaum8tqeM&barrier=accesspaylog

Krafft, C. and Assaad, R. (2018) Introducing the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey 2016. http://www.erfdataportal.com/index.php/citations/8

Population Council (2009) "Survey of young people in Egypt" Cairo: Population Council. https://www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/2010PGY_SYPEFinalReport.pdf

Razzaz, S. (2017) A Challenging Market Becomes More Challenging. Jordanian Workers, Migrant Workers and Refugees in the Jordanian Labour Market. International Labour

Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_556931.pdf

Roushdy, R. and Sieverding, M. (2015) "Panel survey of young people in Egypt 2014: Generating evidence for policy, programs, and research." Cairo: Population Council. https://www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/2015PGY_SYPE-PanelSurvey.pdf

Roushdy, R., Assaad, R. And Rashed, A. (2009) International Migration, Remittances and Household Poverty Status in Egypt. Econometric Methods and Their Applications in Finance, Macro and Related Fields. 353-392.

Tobin, S. and Alahmed, M. (2019) Beyond the work permit quotas: Corruption and other barriers to labour integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan. Chr. Michelsen Institute. https://www.u4.no/publications/beyond-the-work-permit-quotas.pdf

Wahba, J (2007) Return to overseas work experience: the case of Egypt. International Migration, Economic Development & Policy

Zohry, A (2013) Egypt's International Migration After the Revolution: Is there any change?, Confluences Méditerranée, 87 (4), pp. 47-54.

Zohry, A. (2007) "Egyptian Irregular Migration to Europe". Migration Letters. 4(1):53-63.